Enterprise and high-performance computing systems are growing extremely large and complex, employing many processors and diverse software/hardware stacks. As these machines grow in scale, faults become more frequent and system complexity makes it difficult to detect and to diagnose them. The difficulty is particularly large for faults that degrade system performance or cause erratic behavior but do not cause outright crashes. The cost of these errors is high since they significantly reduce system productivity, both initially and by time required to resolve them. Current system management techniques do not work well since they require manual examination of system behavior and do not identify root causes.
I. Introduction
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increases the likelihood that single component failure leads to cascaded failures. Overall, the estimates of economic loss in the US due to faulty software are just under 1% of the national GDP [2] . Further, their frequency, complexity and cost will increase with required increases in system capabilities. We thus require tools that can quickly detect problems and localize their root causes.
Today's tools provide provide vast amounts of system data (logs and node statistics) along with basic search mechanisms [3] , [4] They are are inadequate for today's complex systems because they require humans to process and to interpret this data to detect errors and to infer root causes. These limitations arise from the complex impact of faults, which propagate across components to cause subtle problems such as service degradation. To overcome this challenge, we need models of system behavior that accurately characterize how this behavior deviates when faults occur.
Prior research has developed techniques to generate models of specific systems based on manual system specifications. Although such models can predict the root causes of faults [5] , [6] , they are labor-intensive and may miss complex interactions in which one component influences distant components without affecting intervening ones [7] . Alternatively, fully automated techniques infer the impact of faults on key system behaviors based on statistical models and empirical observations [8] . These models can, in the best case, classify the system's behavior as normal or abnormal and identify the source of the abnormality.
This paper makes two contributions. First, we study the limitations of baseline machine learning models to detect and to characterize system faults. We show that intuitively applying supervised statistical models to complex system faults fails to characterize fault type, time, and location accurately. Second, we design a method that improves model accuracy by combining traditional supervised classifiers with an unsupervised model based on event probabilities that computes the abnormality of individual events. We focus on the most critical capabilities for fault analysis: identification of the type of fault, the time period when the fault is manifested and the system component(s) in which it originates. We target detection and characterization of faults that cause performance degradations, which are more complex than easy-to-detect fail-stop failures. These faults include errant OS daemons or worker threads, poor network performance due to unexpected congestion or cable degradation, and resource exhaustion (e.g., excessive paging and cache churn). Further, we focus on longrunning or commonly-executed applications for which we can build models of both normal and abnormal behavior.
This rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section II contrasts our work with traditional statistical machine learning-based failure detection. Section III describes the applications and statistical methods that our infrastructure uses. Section IV presents our general modeling approach and shows that the intuitive approach achieves poor accuracy. Section V shows how detection accuracy improves when event abnormality information is incorporated into classification algorithms, while Section VI explores the details of how abnormality information should be incorporated into a model to characterize faults accurately. Section VII demonstrates how to identify the fault's location, type, and starting and ending times by aggregating individual fault predictions.
II. State of the Art and Our Approach
Current techniques create a statistical model for an application by training on example application runs, each of which generates a set of observations, or events (e.g. component interactions or the time to execute a function). A supervised algorithm builds its model based on faulty/non-faulty labeling of the training observations as well as context information such as the code region that was being executed and the type of fault. In contrast, unsupervised machine learning does not require labeled observations. Instead, these techniques use a priori assumptions about the structure of the data (e.g., non-faulty observations are common and similar to each other, while faulty observations are abnormal and rare) to build the model. Either kind of training leads to a classification algorithm (e.g., Naive Bayes or Decision Trees) that uses the generated model to identify individual events and production application runs as faulty or non-faulty and even to localize the fault's source and type.
Traditional techniques fail for system faults because of a fundamental mismatch between the time scales at which events can be labeled and at which faults affect system behavior. A fault may affect the system's behavior over the course of seconds or minutes. However, because how software uses the system changes at the granularity of individual loops and function calls, the fault's effect on the system changes at the granularity of microseconds or milliseconds. In practice, as we demonstrate in Section V, a given fault only has a significant effect on a small fraction of such code regions. Since only the coarse-grained fault labels are available to train models, the resulting training set is inherently noisy. This noise leads to inaccuracy in the identification of a fault's type based on its effects on executing software with traditional classifiers.
For example, suppose that a chip overheats due to an internal defect or an unusually hot machine room. Modern processors may react by reducing the chip's frequency. This change affects CPU-intensive code regions but has less impact on memory-intensive regions. Further, consider problematic software component interactions. For example, an errant daemon or a utility thread may degrade the application's performance by polluting the cache whenever it is scheduled. Because operating and runtime systems schedule software in coarse time slices (e.g., ∼100ms in Linux), this pollution only impacts code regions executed soon after the errant software runs. Figure 1 , illustrates why these phenomena make complicate identification of the fault's type. The only information available for training is whether a fault occurs, but the vulnerability of a given execution of a given code region to the fault is not known a priori. As such, all code regions that execute during the fault must be given the same label. If most code regions executed during a fault behave normally, the fault's characteristic effects are difficult to identify via traditional classification algorithms. We use this insight to design a new classification algorithm that recovers this missing information to classify the type of fault correctly based on its effect on application behavior, without requiring any additional information about the application, the system or the hardware.
Our novel solution builds a secondary unsupervised model that captures the probability distribution of each code region's normal behavior, making it possible to identify the events when it behaves abnormally. We use this abnormality information to filter the labeling presented to the classification algorithm to focus it on the abnormal observations. This enables the classifier to identify many more faulty events correctly with fewer false negatives at the cost of a few false positive predictions. Figure 2 shows a diagram that compares the naive classification approach to our refined approach.
The naive approach trains a classification algorithm with execution data that labels each event with the type and location of any fault occurring at the time, if any. The classifier is then applied to events from production runs and events with fault labels (include fault type and location) are presented to the administrator. This approach is inaccurate and frequently reports many events that correspond to the same fault, which can overwhelm system administrators. In contrast, our approach first applies an unsupervised model to identify the events that are abnormal and removes the fault labels from all other events. It then presents this filtered training set to the classification algorithm, which results in improved accuracy. Finally, our approach aggregates fault detections to provide just one notification for each system fault, thus reducing the reporting to system administrators. By focusing the classifier's attention on the low probability events, our approach improves the fault detection and classification accuracy from 12% to 85% on faulty runs, while maintaining a 5% false positive rate.
III. Experimental Setup
We focus on detecting faults in High-Performance Computing (HPC) systems during the execution of scientific applications. HPC systems are large: Top 500 systems can sustain 96 to 10,000 TeraFlops of computational power [9] . Even though these systems use high-quality components, they fail regularly due to their large scale and the complex cross-component interactions. For example, the ASCI Q machine experienced 26.1 CPU failures per week [10] , and the 100,000 node BlueGene/L machine at Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory averages one L1 cache bit flip every 5 hours. From the perspective of applications, HPC systems fail 10-20 times each day due to failures in system hardware and software [11] .
HPC systems primarily run large-scale scientific applications that use MPI (Message Passing Interface) to communicate. We use P n MPI [12] We use the NASA Advanced Supercomputing (NAS) Parallel Benchmarks [13] to represent typical scientific applications, focusing on BT, CG, LU, MG and SP. We omit EP, FT and IS because their use of MPI is so simplistic and infrequent that our monitoring technique, which is done at the granularity of MPI calls, is too coarse to capture their behavior accurately. Finer-grained monitoring can be used and is part of our ongoing work. These applications have setup, main computation and shutdown phases. Since only the main computation phases represent long-running application behavior, we focus on faults that manifest during those phases. We conduct our experiments on 4-socket quad-core Opteron 8356 nodes (10h microarchitecture) with 32GBs of RAM. We execute each application with 16 processes on an input that results in a 10-60 second execution time (class "A" for BT, LU and SP, class "B" for CG, and MG). Each machine has 16 cores so we run all processes on a single node (one process per core).
We use several synthetic faults to model resource exhaustions and slowdowns. Our test harness starts a thread that interferes with the concurrent execution of the main computation by repeatedly executing code that takes up CPU, memory or socket resources. Table I shows the types of faults that we inject and Figure 3 details the operations performed. We do not consider disk faults since nodes in most large HPC systems do not have disks due to power and reliability concerns. Also, we do not consider soft faults (e.g., erroneous computations and data) because they affect application values and, thus, require different detection strategies.
The following sections describe how to train a model to detect faults and characterize their type: CPU, MEM or SOCK. We have two use cases. KnownFault represents situations in which administrators must detect recurrences of previously observed faults that they can describe via synthetic fault reproducers. The UnknownFault use case represents situations in which we must detect new faults that are similar but not identical to the example faults. We train the model on three emulators for each class. CPU_incr, CPU_powlog and CPU_mmm represent CPU faults; MEM_1MB_All, MEM_1GB_All and MEM_1GB_Walk represent MEM faults; while SOCK_1KB_1Mesg, SOCK_1KB_10Msg and SOCK_32KB_10Msg represent SOCK faults. We use the model to detect and to characterize faults that affect CPU_incr, MEM_1GB_All and SOCK_1KB_1Mesg (marked in light gray in Table I ) to evaluate the its effectiveness for the KnownFault use case. We evaluate its effectiveness on UnknownFault by analyzing faults affecting CPU_rank1, MEM_1MB_Walk and SOCK_1KB_10Mesg (marked in dark gray in Table I ). The analyses in Sections IV, V and VI focus on KnownFault; our observations for UnknownFault are similar. We evaluate both use cases in Section VII.
We use hardware performance counters to measure software and hardware behavior. Modern microprocessors provide hundreds of counters; the Opteron 10h microarchitecture has 272 major counters, many with multiple options. However, since it constrains applications to simultaneously monitor no more than four counters (most architectures impose similar constraints), we must choose them carefully to ensure that different fault types can be differentiated. Since counter selection is not the focus of this work, we chose them using a simple algorithm that observes the values of each available counter in fault-free runs and runs injected with each of the three fault types. We computed the range of each counter [average value +/-100 standard deviations], over 20 executions, and selected the counters with ranges that did not overlap in all four fault scenarios to help to differentiate them. In this study we used the following counters [14] : INSTRUCTION_FETCH_STALL, X87_ FLOPS_RETIRED_MULT, BRANCH_TAKEN_RETIRED and DATA_CACHE_ACCESSES.
IV. Modeling Approach
This section describes our approach for modeling application behavior. Models are trained on example non-faulty application runs as well as runs with various types of faults injected. When applied to new runs they classify individual events as non-faulty or faulty and if faulty, indicate the fault's type and location. This initial approach is a naive application of classification algorithms to the problem of fault detection and classification. Figure 2 illustrates our procedure. We train models on 16 non-faulty runs and 16 faulty runs of each type (3 fault types, 3 examples of each), a total of 160 runs of each application. During the i th faulty run, we inject the fault into the i th process of the MPI application (each run uses 16 processes) to capture the effect of faults on each process. In each faulty execution, the fault thread's execution is overlapped with most of the application's main computation phase. We evaluate models on a similar additional set of runs, except that we draw the faults from either the KnownFault or UnknownFault use cases (depending on the experiment) and execute the fault thread for 1 second at a random point in the main computation phase. Further, we evaluate the techniques on 40 additional non-faulty runs.
Events observed in training runs are annotated as:
• NO_FAULT: No fault executed during the event, of the given type executed at the same time as the event but on a different process. We then train a supervised classifier on the event's feature vector: (i) unique ID of its starting and ending MPI call stacks, (ii) execution time, and (iii) elapsed values of the four performance counters. We used the Weka 3.6.2 [15] implementations of the following supervised classifiers: Random Forest, C4.5 Decision Tree, Logit Boost and Random Committee. Since the large event counts in the training runs (from 7e+5 for MG to 2e+7 for LU) make training on all events too expensive, we trained classifiers on 500 randomly chosen events in each of the 160 runs, for a total of 80,000 events.
To determine whether the application is faulty at a given point in time we then aggregate events from all processes into 50ms non-overlapping time windows and use the labels of the events in each window to label the window itself. A window is labeled NO_FAULT if all its events are labeled NO_FAULT or OTHER_PROCESS. If some window events have THIS_PROCESS fault labels, it is labeled faulty. We use the most common fault type (CPU/MEM/SOCK) among the individual event labels as the fault's type. We use the process on which the largest fraction of events have THIS_PROCESS fault labels as the fault's location. Figure 4 shows the accuracy of this approach with the Logit Boost and Random Committee classifiers for the evaluation runs from the KnownFault use-case. The bars correspond to the following:
• Real Fault: percentage of the windows during which a fault occurs that the classifier flags with the correct fault type and location.
• Real Non-Fault: percentage of non-faulty windows that the classifier correctly flags as non-faulty. These experiments show that all classifiers perform very poorly on windows with faults. In contrast, the classifiers are usually correct when they label windows as non-faulty. However, the Random Committee classifier can mislabel windows in which no fault occurred. Figure 5 , which shows the performance of the classifiers on evaluation runs where no fault is injected, further supports these conclusions. Because it is more selective in its classifications, Logit Boost performs best on most of our experiments, especially as part of the fault clustering algorithm that we describe in Section VII. Our remaining results thus focus on Logit Boost. To determine whether the reason for the classifiers' poor accuracy is a lack of information about the application's behavior during the fault we expanded the feature vectors to include historical context. These vectors consist of the counter values of sequences of five preceding events, in contrast to the original one-event feature vectors. Each feature vector was five times larger and was labeled using the label of the last event in the sequence. Figure 6 (a) and (b) show the accuracy of this model on labeling 50ms time windows, constructed as above, in the KnownFault faulty runs and non-faulty runs with Logit Boost. The resulting classifier misses all faults, indicating that additional history information does not help and indeed reduces accuracy, probably because of. overfitting that occurs for models with too many parameters.
V. Abnormality-Enhanced Classification
The naïve approach performs poorly because system faults do not affect applications consistently (e.g. faults that affect CPU performance have little effect on memoryintensive code). Software problems are even more irregular because they are subject to OS scheduling. Figure 7 illustrates this effect in a run of the BT application with an injected CPU-intensive thread. The horizontal axis shows individual events ordered in time and the vertical axis shows the abnormality value of the event, measured as −log(probability of event's counter values). These abnormality values, defined precisely below, are larger for more unlikely events; the logarithm focuses the view on the most unlikely events. All events during the non-faulty time period behave normally (abnormalities < 1E+2). When the fault is injected most events still behave normally, while only a few events are significantly affected (abnormalities ∼ 1E+6). This is because the CPU intensive fault only affects some code regions in BT and only the events that correspond to them are abnormal.
Drawback of traditional classifiers
Traditional classifiers perform poorly on this problem because the probability distribution from which event behaviors are sampled depends on information that is not available as part of training, as is illustrated in Figure 8 . A given application execution may be fault-free or affected by one An execution is a sequence of events and the performance counter values observed during each event depend on its code region, the current fault type (if any) and whether the code region's current execution is vulnerable to this fault. The model training procedure runs the application, chooses the faults to inject (if any) and observes which code regions are executed and their associated performance counter values. However, this procedure cannot determine how vulnerable a given execution of a code region is to the given fault because this requires a very detailed understanding of both the program and the underlying system (e.g. hardware properties and OS scheduler's state). In fact, if such an analysis were available, statistical models would not be needed. Since this key piece of information is not available to the training procedure or to the classifier being trained, it is approximated by labeling all the events that occur during a fault as "faulty". Preprocessing via unsupervised learning This labeling produces a very noisy training set that consists of the "Normal" events -almost all behave normally with a few outliers, and "Faulty" events -most behave normally and some behave abnormally. The significant overlap in behaviors of the two sets makes it very difficult for most classifiers to differentiate them. As such, it should be possible to significantly improve the quality of the training data via an additional analysis that infers the vulnerability of code regions to faults from the available information. A code region's execution is vulnerable to a fault if its behavior is significantly affected by it. Thus, vulnerability can be approximated via a test of whether whether a given event represents normal or abnormal behavior of its code region within its associated execution context. The hypothesis is that using the resulting Normal/Abnormal labels will enable the classifiers to achieve significantly higher fault detection and classification accuracy.
We evaluate this hypothesis via a simple unsupervised algorithm. This algorithm builds for each code region and event context (call stack) a separate probability distribution for each of the five observed quantities (execution time and the four performance counters) over all non-faulty events in training executions that share this context (a total of five 1-dimensional distributions per context). A given event is Normal if there is a high probability of observing its time and counter values given the distribution of its code region and context. It is deemed Abnormal otherwise. The probability distributions of the time and performance counters are approximated them using normalized histograms, which is a non-parametric density estimator.
We implement normalized histograms through an algorithm used in the AutomaDeD tool [16] , which does not require an a priori range of values. First, we eliminate outliers by removing the top and bottom 10% of the observed data values. We then assign the remaining values to a fixed number of clusters and create a histogram bucket for each cluster. To derive a continuous probability distribution we (i) linearly interpolate between adjacent buckets, (ii) attach the upper and lower halves of a Gaussian distribution to the largest and smallest bucket to model probabilities outside the observed region, and then (iii) normalize the resulting function so the area under the curve is 1, as required for a probability distribution. Our experiments use histograms with 30 clusters, which as our experiments show are appropriate for most cases, producing density models that faithfully capture the major details of the underlying distributions. The simplest way to use these probability distributions is to refine the existing faulty/non-faulty label within the training inputs provided to the classification algorithms in Section IV. We measure the "abnormality value" of each event in the training runs in terms of the negative logarithms of the probabilities of its five observable quantities: time and performance counters. The logarithm provides greater resolution for the small probabilities of abnormal events and the negation ensures that abnormal events have high abnormality values, which is more intuitive. The abnormality value of an entire event is the Euclidean average of the abnormality values of its observed quantities:
, where prob i is the probability of quantity i within the event given the observed distribution of that quantity, and n = 5 for our work.
In training, all events that occur while a fault thread executes and have abnormality values above a given threshold are labeled with the fault's type and location. All events that occur while there is no fault or that have abnormality values below the threshold are labeled "non-faulty". The threshold is the maximum abnormality value observed during the non-faulty training runs value plus three standard deviations. This clearly differentiates abnormal events from the normal ones. Further, since the raw abnormality value −log(prob i ) of each event with respect to the distribution of each observable i is available and can help point to the type of fault that is occurring, these five probabilities (time and 4 counters) are included as additional features in the training set. Thus, for each event, we have 11 features: the event context, 5 observables (time and 4 counters), and 5 abnormality values. Finally, while we trained our original model on 80,000 randomly chosen events, we train the abnormality-enhanced model on 40,000 normal events and 15,000 abnormal events (divided evenly among training runs) to ensure that it is trained on both event types. These event counts ensure that the comparison between the naïve and abnormality-enhanced models is not biased against the naïve by constraining the latter to train on fewer events than the naïve model. Results from the unsupervised learning pre-step Figure 9 (a) shows the difference between the success rates of this new predictor with abnormality information (denoted ''Abnorm Feature'') and that of the original predictor (denoted ''Plain Classifier'') on KnownFault faulty runs (similar results are seen for UnknownFault). As before, we show accuracy for labeling 50ms time windows, which describe the aggregate health of all application processes rather than just one event. Abnormality information increases the fraction of actually faulty windows that were detected by approximately 15% but time windows that are actually faulty are still classified incorrectly. The fraction of correct classifications is improved by approximately 60%. When a windows are correctly classified as faulty, such classification consistently capture the fault's correct type and location (the application process that was faulty). When windows are erroneously classified as faulty, the assigned labels are erratic, with nearby windows being labeled with different fault locations and types. Section VII presents an algorithm that uses this property to detect faults by looking at clusters of frequent identical fault classifications. Although abnormality information improves fault detection rates (Figure 9(a) ), it also slightly increases the number of non-faulty windows classified as faulty by approximately .25%. As discussed in Section VII, these errors cause some false positives in tools based on this model but do not significantly degrade the technique's overall utility.
VI. Managing Training Features
We have established that filtering the training set based on event abnormalities improves model accuracy. We now investigate how the way the new information is used by the Abnorm Feature algorithm influences its accuracy. Table II describes the models analyzed in this section, detailing the number and type of feature they use.
First we explore whether additional features that further clarify the fault type can improve accuracy. The Abnorm Prob Feature algorithm, illustrated in Figure 10 , computes probability distributions for the abnormal events for each fault type. Probability distributions are created with normalized histograms as before. In our experiments this produces 15 distributions: 5 observables times 3 fault types. Each event's feature vector from the Abnorm Feature training set is then extended with the probability of its observables with respect to each of these distributions (these are denoted "abnormality probabilities"). For a given event the probability of some observable O with respect to a distribution associated with fault type F measures how similar this event's observable O is to observable O of abnormal events induced by fault F . This training type produces a training set with 26 features: the calling context, 5 observables (time and 4 performance counters), 5 abnormality values and 15 abnormality probabilities. Since the above training set has a large number of features, model accuracy may be poor due to overfitting. Further, the combination of abnormality values and abnormality probabilities obscures their relative utility. As such, we also evaluate a variant of this algorithm that prunes the features used by Abnorm Prob Feature by removing the observables and the abnormality values, leaving only each event's calling context and its abnormality probabilities (16 features). This approach, which we denote Only Abnorm Prob Feature, is similar to a Naïve Bayes classifier. Like in Abnorm Feature, the training set is filtered such that only abnormal events are given a fault label. Since we build abnormality distributions using only abnormal events, relatively few of which are observed, if we do not observe any such events for a given event context, probability information is not used for events with this context. Figures 11(a,b) and 12(a,b) show the accuracy difference between these training sets and Abnorm Feature on labeling 50ms time windows using the Logit Boost classifier on KnownFault faulty runs and non-faulty runs, respectively (e.g. Abnorm Prob Feature -Abnorm Feature). The introduction of new features (Abnorm Prob Feature) reduces the accuracy of the classifier both for windows during faulty runs that are classified as faulty (23% reduction on average) and windows that are actually non-faulty during non-faulty runs (2% reduction). However, it is still better than the Plain classifier. Training using Only Abnorm Prob Feature, which removes observables and abnormality values, also reduces accuracy relative to Abnorm Feature but to a smaller extent (average 11% less accurate on windows classified as faulty in faulty runs, 1.5% less on actually non-faulty windows during non-faulty runs). This indicates that abnormality probabilities are less useful than abnormality values but the reason for this is not clear. Since Only Abnorm 9. Difference in accuracy on non-faulty runs using abnormality as a feature, relative to Abnorm Filter Prob Feature is more accurate than Abnorm Prob Feature, the larger number of features in the latter (26 vs 16) must be confusing the classifier. This may also explain the poorer accuracy of Only Abnorm Prob Feature relative to Abnorm Feature since the former has almost three times as many features as the latter. If that is the case then a more sophisticated classifier may be able to take advantage of the additional features. Another explanation may be that since normal events are much more common than abnormal ones, the probabilities used by Abnorm Feature (based on normal events) are significantly more accurate than the probabilities used by Only Abnorm Prob Feature (based on abnormal events). If this is the explanation for Only Abnorm Prob Feature's lower accuracy, then the use of more training runs should improve it. We leave a more detailed evaluation of these models to future work.
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Since addition of features results in worse accuracy, we also evaluate the ''Abnorm Filter'' algorithm, which takes the training set from Abnorm Feature and excludes each event's 5 abnormality values with respect to each observable (time and 4 counters). Here too abnormality values are used to label only the abnormal events as faulty. Figures 11(c) and 12(c) compare the accuracy of the resulting classifier to Abnorm Feature, using Logit Boost on labeling 50ms time windows in KnownFault runs and non-faulty runs, respectively (Abnorm Filter -Abnorm Feature). The removal of the abnormality features has little effect on overall model accuracy in general and actually improves it for LU in faulty runs. This means that these features do not provide any additional power with respect to the original observation values, at least not with the Logit Boost classifier. As such, the main value of the probability distributions is in filtering fault/non-fault labels rather than as serving as a feature in their own right.
Another issue with applying statistical methods to application behavior is that different code regions behave very differently, with some significantly longer than others. Thus, a given number of cache misses (counters provide the total count of misses, not the rate) that is highly abnormal for one code region may be perfectly ordinary for another. Because this makes it more difficult for classifiers to find general patterns that apply to different code regions, we evaluated the use of relative rather than absolute observations to train the models. We modified the training set from Abnorm Filter by dividing each event's the raw event counter values by its execution time. This training approach is denoted ''Abnorm Filter Relative'' and Figures 11(d) and 12(d) show the difference between it and Abnorm Feature in KnownFault runs and non-faulty runs. The use of relative observations improves accuracy on faulty windows during faulty runs by 2% and reduces it for actually non-faulty windows during non-faulty runs by .4%. Section VII shows that the improved accuracy during faulty runs has a greater effect on our tools ultimate effectiveness than the difference for non-faulty runs.
VII. Event Clustering Fault Detection
Fault detection and characterization at the level of individual events or 50ms time windows is too fine-grained and verbose for human consumption. System administrators instead need a tool that concisely summarizes the time period when the fault occurred, the portion of the system affected and the fault's type without excessive duplication. We now present techniques that provide this level of information.
Our classification algorithms label individual events and time windows with the type of fault that occurred, if any. To aggregate these labels into a single report of a fault's time, location and type it is necessary to look for a dense set of time windows that have the same fault classification label. We do this via a simple one-pass algorithm that identifies a time period as faulty if:
• Its starting and ending windows have fault labels; and • In the intervening windows, those with fault labels have the same fault type and location process and Figure 11 . Difference in accuracy on KnownFault faulty runs using abnormality as a feature, relative to Abnorm Filter remaining windows have the NO_FAULT label; and • All adjacent time windows with a fault label are less than τ seconds away from each other. The parameter τ controls the fault density of the desired clusters; our experiments use τ = .5s. This simple algorithm provides low-latency online fault detection and produces the same performance as more complex, less intuitive algorithms. Figure 13 shows fault prediction accuracy on the KnownFault faulty runs and non-faulty runs with our algorithm and the Logit Boost classifier that was trained using the Plain Classifier, Abnorm Filter and Abnorm Filter Relative algorithms. A fault detection is defined as successful if it identifies the correct fault type and location for a single contiguous time period that overlaps with the time when the fault was injected and does not exceed the duration of the actual fault injection by more than a factor of 2. Thus, success is declared if and only if each fault generates a single alert that closely resembles the fault's properties. We see that the clustering algorithm has poor accuracy when it uses the Plain Classifier, with only 9% of real faults detected and only 32% of alerts being correct. However, it has no false positives on the non-faulty runs. The reason is that its predictions are very erratic and thus it is unlikely that two adjacent predictions are identical. The result is that it predicts no faults at all.
The accuracy of Abnorm Filter for real faults is significantly higher, between 67% for CG and 99% for BT. Fault classifications are accurate from 67% of the time for SP to 90% for MG. On non-faulty runs it misdetects faults between 0% of the time for MG to 12.5% for BT. Abnorm Filter Relative improves accuracy further, detecting real faults between 76% of the time for CG and 97% for BT. On non-faulty runs, its false positive rate ranges from 0% for LU and 7.5% for BT. Figure 14 shows the difference in accuracy for detecting faults that were similar to the training set but not included in it (UnknownFault) and those that were in On non-faulty runs, Plain never mistakenly detects faults. Abnorm Filter incorrectly detect faults in 0-12.5% (6% on average) of non-faulty runs and Abnorm Filter Relative makes such mistakes on 0-8.5% (5% on average) of the runs.
Clustering based on Abnorm Feature results in slightly worse accuracy than with Abnorm Filter. While, accuracy improves if it is augmented with relative observations, much like Abnorm Filter the rate of mistaken fault detections during non-faulty runs grows worse. With Abnorm Prob Feature and Only Abnorm Prob Feature, which use abnormality probabilities, accuracy is significantly worse both in faulty and fault-free runs, usually by tens of percentage points.
VIII. Related Work
We group automatic fault detection methods into two categories. The first category, the probability-based- classifier (or generative) approach, classifies events based on their probability as derived from a probability model (usually a distribution). Cohen et al. [17] build a TreeAugmented Naive (TAN) Bayesian network model to predict Service Level Objectives (SLOs) violations by capturing correlations of system metrics more efficiently than in a Bayesian network. Guo et al. [18] use a mixture of Gaussian distributions to capture the probability of performance metrics. Other approaches [7] model probability distributions with histograms to characterize deviations from normal behavior. Hamerly and Elkan [19] predict disk failures with Bayesian classifiers and mixture models.
The second method, the traditional-classifier (or discriminative) approach, uses a classifier such as a decision tree, neural network or a clustering algorithm to determine whether events are normal or abnormal. Chen et al [20] train a probabilistic context-free grammar on faulty and non-faulty runs to identify abnormal web requests in large e-commerce systems. Ozonat et al [21] detect performance anomalies by clustering application traces and looking for small clusters. Gao et al [22] use a Markov model to identify abnormal changes of system metrics correlations.
Our work combines these approaches. We use abnormality information (a generative approach) to filter input for the traditional-classifier approach. We demonstrate that the combination improves detection accuracy for common faults. To the best of our knowledge, no previous work has studied a similar hybrid technique.
IX. Summary
We examined the problem of detecting, localizing and characterizing system faults using statistical modeling of application and system behavior. We showed experimentally that naïve use of supervised statistical classifiers with this problem performs poorly. We identified the reason for this disappointing performance to be the fact that system faults affect application behavior inconsistently, strongly affecting some application regions, and leaving most to execute normally. We used this insight to improve the quality of fault characterization by using event abnormality information to refine the training set provided to the classifiers. Our approach builds a secondary unsupervised model to evaluate the probability that a given event will appear in a non-faulty execution. We then labeled only the truly abnormal events as faulty and used these probabilities as model features. Our experiments showed that abnormalitybased filtering significantly improves the accuracy of characterizing a fault's type, location and time period while probability features are less useful. We also showed that providing relative rather than absolute performance measurements as features can further improve accuracy on top of filtering. Specifically we demonstrate that the Abnorm Filter Relative classifier works best, characterizing faults that were anticipated by administrators with 87% accuracy, un-anticipated faults with 85% accuracy and with a 5% false positive rate on non-faulty runs.
